We introduce the notion of fault tolerant mechanism design, which extends the stan dard game theoretic framework of mechanism design to allow for uncertainty about execu tion. Specifically, we define the problem of task allocation in which the private informa tion of the agents is not only their costs to attempt the tasks, but also their probabili ties of failure. For several different instances of this setting we present technical results, including positive ones in the form of mecha nisms that are incentive compatible, individ ually rational and efficient, and negative ones in the form of impossibility theorems.
INTRODUCTION
Recent years have seen much activity at the interface of computer science and game theory, in particular in the area of Mechanism Design, or MD (e.g. ( A sub-area of game theory, MD is the science of craft ing protocols for self-interested agents, and as such is natural fodder for computer science in general and AI in particular. The uniqueness of the MD perspective is that it concentrates on protocols for non-cooperative agents. Indeed, traditional game theoretic work on MD focuses uniquely on the incentive aspects of the protocols.
A promising application of MD to AI is the problem of task allocation among self-interested agents (see e.g. (Rosenschein & Zlotkin 1994) ). When only the execu tion costs are taken into account, the task allocation problem allows standard mechanism design solutions. However, this setting does not take into consideration the possibility that agents might fail to complete their assigned tasks. When this possibility is added to the framework, existing results cease to apply. The goal of this paper is to investigate robustness to failures in the game theoretic framework in which each agent is rational and self-motivated. Specifically, we consider the design of protocols for agents which have not only private cost functions, but also privately-known prob abilities of failure.
What criteria should such protocols meet? Traditional MD has a standard set of criteria for successful out comes, namely social efficiency (maximizing the sum of the agents' utilities), individual rationality (posi tive utility for all participants), and incentive com patibility (incentives for agents to reveal their pri vate information). Fault Tolerant Mechanism Design (FTMD) strives to satisfy these same goals; the key difference is that the agents have richer private infor mation (namely probability of failure, in addition to cost). As we will see, this extension presents novel challenges.
It is important to distinguish between different pos sible types of failure. The focus of this paper is on failures that occur when agents make a full effort to complete their assigned tasks, but may fail. A more nefarious situation would be one in which agents may also fail deliberately when it is rational to do so. While we do not formally consider this possibility, we will re visit it at the end of the paper to explain why our results hold in this case as well. Finally, one can con sider the case in which there exist irrational agents whose actions (for example, intentional failures) are counter to their best interests. This is the most diffi cult type of failure to handle, because the presence of such agents can affect the strategy of rational agents, in addition to directly affecting the outcome. We leave this case to future work.
It is helpful to consider a concrete example. Consider a network of links which are owned by selfish agents (e.g. airline companies), and two distinguished nodes S and T in it. We allow multiple links between nodes so that more than one agent can provide the same ser vice (but only agent can be selected to do so). When an object is routed through a link, the owning agent incurs some cost. In addition, the agent may fail ( ac cording to some probability) to pass the object across the link (e.g., the object is lost in transit, or not deliv ered by a strict deadline). The costs and probabilities are privately known to their owners. Our goal is to design a mechanism (protocol) that will ensure that objects will be sent from S to T across the network in the most reliable and cost-effective way possible.
To demonstrate the challenges encountered when fac ing such problems, consider even the simple case in which the network consists of only parallel links be tween SandT, and costs are all zero. A naive proto col would ask each agent for their probability, choose the most reliable agent (according to the declarations) and pay her a fixed, positive amount if she succeeds, and zero otherwise. Of course, in this case each agent will report a probability of one in order to selfishly maximize her own expected profit.
In this paper we study progressively more complex task-allocation problems. The first problem that we study is one in which there is only one task. We use this setting both to show why standard MD solutions are not applicable and to present our basic technique in the form of a novel mechanism. After extending this technique to handle the case of multiple tasks without dependencies among them, we move to the general case of dependent tasks. Here, we prove an impossibility re sult when we demand incentive compatibility in dom inant strategies, and present a mechanism that solves in equilibrium the case of dependent tasks. Finally, we discuss the use of cost verification to significantly improve the revenue properties of the center.
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RELATED WORK
The work presented in this paper integrates techniques of economic mechanism design (an introduction to MD can be found in (Mas-Collel, Whinston, & Green 1995, chapter 23)) with studies of fault tolerant problem solving in computer science and AI.
In particular, the technique used in our mechanism is similar to that of the Generalized Vickrey Auction (GVA) (Vickrey 1961; Clarke 197 1; Groves 1973) in that it aligns the utility of the agents with the overall welfare. This similarity is almost unavoidable, as this alignment is the only known general principle for solv ing mechanism design problems. However, because we allow for the possibility of failures, we will need to change the GVA in a significant way in order for our mechanism to achieve this alignment.
Because we have added probabilities to our setting, our mechanisms may seem to be related to the Expected Externality Mechanism (or d'AGVA) (d 'Aspremont & Gerard-Varet 1979) , but there are key differences. In the setting of d'AGVA, the types of the agents are drawn (independently) from a distribution which is assumed to be common knowledge among the par ticipants. The two key differences in our setting are that no such common knowledge assumption is made and that the solution concepts which we guarantee are stronger than that of d'AGVA.
A recent paper (Eliaz 2002 ) also considers failures in MD, but solves a different problem. This work assumes that agents know the types of all other rational agents and also limits the failures that can occur by bounding the number of irrational agents.
Finally, the design of protocols which are robust to failures has a long tradition in computer science (for a survey, see (Linial 1994) ). Work in this area, however, almost always assumes a set of agents that are by and large cooperative and adhere to a central protocol, ex cept for some subset of malicious agents who may do anything to disrupt the protocol. In MD settings, the participants fit neither of these classes, but are simply self-interested.
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A BA SIC MODEL
In this section we describe our basic model and no tation, which will be modified later to handle specific settings.
In a FTMD problem, we have a set of t tasks T = {1, ... ,t } and a set N = {1, ... ,n } of self-interested agents to which the tasks can be assigned. We also have a center M who assigns tasks to agents and pays them for their work. The center and the agents will collectively be called the participants.
Each agent i has, for each task j, a probability Pii E [0, 1] of successfully completing task j, and a nonnega tive cost Cij E � + of attempting the task. We assume that the cost of attempting a task does not depend on the success of the attempt. We use Pi =(pi!, ... ,pit) for the set of all probabilities for agent i, and use p = (p1, ... ,pn) to represent the set of probability vec tors for all agents. We use corresponding notation for Ci and c. The pair ()i = (pi, ci ) is called the agent's type and is privately known to the agent. Each agent is as signed a set Ai of tasks, and her cost to attempt the set is: Ci(Ai) = I: j EA , Cij· We define()= (B1, ... , Bn) as the vector of types for all agents.
We use a completion vector 11-E { 0, 1 }I to denote which tasks have been completed. The function V: {0, 1 }t --> w + defines the center's nonnegative valuation for each possible completion vector. For now, we assume that the center has a non-combinatorial valuation for a set of tasks. That is, the value of a set of tasks is the sum of the values for the individual tasks. We also assume that V(J. L) 2': 0 for all J.L and that V(O, ... , 0) = 0.
An assignment vector A = (A 1, ... , An) and a vec tor of agent probabilities p together induce a proba bility distribution over the completion vector which we denote by [J. LIA, p] . Given an assignment A, a type vector () and a completion vector J.L, we de fine the welfare of the participants as W(A, c, J.L) = V(J.L) -I;; c;(A;). We define the expected welfare as
The goal of the cen ter is to design a mechanism (protocol) that maximizes this expected welfare.
We assume that each task can be assigned only once. The center does not have to allocate all the tasks. For notational convenience we assume that all the non allocated tasks are assigned to a dummy agent 0 which for each task has zero probability of success and zero cost to attempt.
When an agent i is assigned a set A; of tasks, and is paid R;, her utility equals u; = R; -c;(A;). Since our setting is stochastic by nature, an agent can do no better than to maximize her expected utility, ii.;, calculated before any task is attempted. This term thus depends on the true probabilities of success of the agents, as explained below.
Throughout the paper we shall use the following vector notations: The subscript -i on a vector denotes that the term for agent i has been omitted from the vector. For example, P-i = (pi, ... ,p;-J,Pi + l, ... ,Pn)· The omitted term can be combined with such a vector by using the following notation: p = (p;, p-;). We de note by J. L; the completion vector for agent i (i.e. we have 1 for each task accomplished by agent i and 0 for each one either failed by her or not assigned to her). The definitions for J.L-i and (J.L;, J.L-;) follow similarly. Sometimes we will use J.Li in place of p;. Since both vectors are of the same form, a 0 or 1 for task t 1 in J.L; becomes the probability of successfully completing t1.
Mechanisms
A mechanism is a protocol that decides how to assign the tasks to the agents and how much each agent is paid. The simplest type of mechanisms are ones in which the agents are simply required to report their types. (Of course they may lie!) The revelation prin ciple (see e.g. (Mas-Collel, Whinston, & Green 1995 , p. 871)) tells us that we can, w.l.o.g., restrict ourselves to such mechanisms.
We denote by the vector 0 the types declared by the agents . A mechanism is thus defined by a pair g = (A(O), R(O, J.L)) such that:
is an assignment func tion. It takes a declaration vector and returns an assignment of the tasks to the agents.
•
is the payment function.
In our motivating example, a type (); would correspond to agent i's costs and probabilities of success on each of her edges.
In our protocol, the center first asks each agent to de clare her type. We call an agent truthful if she reveals her true type to the center. Based on these declara tions the center first computes the assignment A(O). Then, the agents execute their tasks. Finally, the cen ter pays the agents. Note that these payments de pend on the set of tasks which were accomplished. We assume that the agents always attempt each task to which they are assigned. In our discussion section, we explain why this is a valid assumption.
In the above protocol, ii.;(C;, 0;, 0_;, p) =
The main difference between mechanism design prob lems and the usual algorithmic problems is that the participating agents may manipulate the given proto col if it is beneficial for them to do so. We therefore need to design protocols that fulfill our objectives even though the agents behave selfishly. We thus require our mechanism to satisfy the following standard properties:
Individual rationality (IR) holds when truthful agents are guaranteed to have non-negative expected utility. Formally, for all i, () and 0_;: ii.;(c;, ();, O_;, p) 2': 0.
Incentive compatibility (IC) holds when it is a domi nant strategy for each agent to declare her type truth fully. Formally, this condition holds, when for all i, (), ();, and 0_;: ii.;(c;, B;, O-;, p) :2: ii.; (c;, B;, o_;, p). This means that the expected utility of the agent ( condi tional on her own probability of success) is maximized when the agent reports her true type.
A mechanism is called socially efficient (SE) if the cho sen assignment maximizes the expected welfare W. The fact that W depends on the true types of the agents underscores the importance of IC, which allows the center to correctly assume that 0 = ().
Individual rationality for the center (CR) holds if the center's utility
is always nonneg ative. CR is an extension of the standard mechanism design requirement of weak budget balance to account for the center's utility for outcomes.
A final goal is no fr ee riders (NFR), which holds if all agents not assigned any task have a revenue of zero.
SINGLE TA SK SETTING
We will start with the special case of a single task to show our basic technique to handle the possibility of failures in MD. For expositional purposes, we will analyze two restricted settings (the first restricts prob abilities of success to be one, and the second restricts costs to be zero), before formally proving properties about our mechanism in the full single task setting.
Because there is only one task, we can simplify the notation. We let Ci and Pi denote CiJ and Pil, re spectively. Similarly, we let V = V( (1)) , which is the value that the center assigns to the completion of the task. For each mechanism, we will use the index [1] to denote the agent selected to attempt the task (e.g., P [ l] denotes the selected agent's probability of success). The subscript [2] then refers to the agent who would be selected as the service provider if agent [1] had not participated.
CASE 1: ONLY COSTS
When we do not allow for failures (that is, 'Vi P i = 1) , the goal of social efficiency reduces to assigning the task the lowest-cost agent. This simplified problem can be solved using a second-price auction (which is a specific case of GVA). Each agent declares a cost, the task is assigned to the agent with the lowest cost, and that agent is paid the second-lowest submitted cost.
CASE 2: ONLY FAILURES
We now reduce the problem in a different way, by as suming all costs to be zero (\;/i ci = 0). In this case, the main goal is to allocate the task to the most reliable agent. Interestingly, we cannot use a straightforward application of the GVA for this case. Such a mech anism would ask each agent to declare a probability of success and assign the task to the agent with the highest declared probability. It would set the revenue function for all agents not assigned the task to be 0, while the service provider would be paid the amount by which her presence increases the welfare of the other agents and the center: P[ l ] V -.P 12 1 V. Obviously, such a mechanism is not incentive compatible, because the payment to the service provider depends on her own declared type! Since there are no costs, each agent would have a dominant strategy to declare her proba bility of success as one.
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Thus, we need to fundamentally alter our payment rule so that it depends on the outcome of the attempt, and not solely on the declared types, as it does in the GVA. The key difference in our setting that forces this change is the fact that the true type of an agent now directly affects the outcome, whereas in the standard MD setting the type of an agent only affects her pref erences over outcomes. We accomplish our goals by replacing P[ l ] with an indicator function that is 1 if the task was completed, and 0 otherwise. The pay ment rule for the service provider is now V -.P 12 1 V if she succeeds and -.P 12 1 V if she fails. Just as in the previous setting, the service provider is the only agent who has positive utility for attempting the task with the corresponding payment rule. The expected utility for agent i would be
This expression is positive for the agent iff P i > P [2], which is only true for the service provider.
CASE 3: COSTS AND FAILURES
We now consider the case of one task with both costs and failures.
We introduce the following definition that we will use throughout the paper: Given an agent i we denote by W .
:'.i(c-; , P-i) the optimal (declared) expected welfare when tasks cannot be allocated to agent i. In the single task case it is maxN;(PJ · V-c1 ) . Now we can define the mechanism.
Single Task Mechanism: Assignment The mechanism chooses an agent i E {0, .. . , n} that maximizes the (declared) expected welfare w = Pi· v-c;.
Payment The payment to all agents not assigned a task is always zero. The payment to the "winner" i is defined as follows:
If i succeeds If i fails Using P[2] and c121 to denote the probability and the cost of the "second best" agent, the payment to agent i when she succeeds is (V -P[2] · V + c12 1 ) and when she fails is ( -p12 1 · V +c[2 J ) · Note that W* is never negative 2In fact, this would be true for any payment rule for which an agent's payment is always nonnegative, which is the reason why we require our goals (such as IC and IR) to be satisfied for the expected utility of the agent, and not for ex post utility.
because the center will never make an assignment that yields an expected loss for the system.
For example, suppose we have three agents with the types listed in Table 1 . Let V be 210. If the agents are truthful, then the winner is agent 3. If agent 3 did not exist, the optimal expected welfare would be w.: 3 = 210 -100 = 110, because the task would be assigned to agent 2. The payment for agent 3 is therefore 210-110 = 100 if she succeeds and -110 if she fails. Agent 3's own costs are 60, and thus her expected utility is (100-60) . 0.9 + ( -110-60) . 0.1 = 19. We will prove each property separately.
Individual Rationality
We need to prove that the expected utility of a truthful agent is always non negative. When agent i is truthful her expected util ity is U ; = W(A((I1;, 11�;)), (c;, c_;), (p;,fi-;)) -w.:;(c_;,fi-;J. By the optimality of A(.), the sec ond term quantifies the optimal welfare that can be obtained when the types of the other agents are 11 �i and i does not exist. Similarly, the first term quantifies the optimal welfare when the types of the other agents are 11 �i and the type of agent i is the true one 11;. Since i can only improve the total welfare, we proved our claim.
Incentive Compatibility
We need to prove that the expected utility of each agent i is maximized when she is truthful. Let 11 �i denote the declarations of the other agents. As before, when the agent is truthful her util ity is U; = W(A( (I1;, 11�; 
Social Efficiency
Immediate from IC and the definition of A(.).
No Free Riders
Immediate from the definition of the payment rule.
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MULTIPLE TA SKS
We now return to the original setting presented in this paper, consisting of t tasks for which the center has a non-combinatorial valuation (that is, the value for a set of tasks is equal to the sum of the values for the individual tasks). Because the setting disallows any interaction between tasks, we can construct a mecha nism that satisfies all of our goals by generalizing the Single Task Mechanism.
Multiple Task In other words, each agent is paid according to her contribution to the welfare of the other participants.
Proposition 2 The Multiple Task mechanism satis fies IC, IR, SE, CR, and NFR.
The proof is similar to the single task case and is omit ted. Note that the theorem holds even when the cost functions and probabilities of success have a combina torial nature.
COMBINATORIAL V
We now consider the setting in which the center's valu ation V ( · ) can be any monotone function of the tasks. Unfortunately, in this setting, it is impossible to satisfy all our goals simultaneously.
Theorem 3 When V is combinatorial, there does not exist a mechanism that satisfies IC, IR, CR, and SE for any n 2: 2 and t ;::: 2.
Intuitively it is enough to consider the following case which no mechanism is able to solve. There are two tasks, each of which can only be completed by one agent (and, this one agent is different for the two tasks). The center only has a positive value (call it x) for both tasks being completed. Since both agents add a value of x to the system, they can each extract close to x from the center, causing the center to pay double for the utility of x he will gain from the com pletion of the task. Due to space constraints, we omit the formal proof of this theorem.
However, despite the possibility of failures we can maintain the desired properties other than CR using the same mechanism as before.
Theorem 4 The Multiple Task mechanism satisfies IC, IR, SE, and NFR, even when V is combinatorial.
Again, we omit the proof. Intuitively, IC, IR, and NFR are not affected by a combinatorial V because they are only properties of the agents, and SE still follows from IC and the definition of A ( -).
DEPENDENCIES
We now return to the case of non-combinatorial valu ation V (-) , and analyze a different extension: depen dencies between the tasks.
Consider our motivating example of a network of flights. A natural example of a task dependency would be an object that could not be carried over the edge (b, c) before being carried over (a, b).
Formally, we say that a task j is dependent on a set s of tasks if j cannot be attempted unless all tasks in s were successfully finished. We assume that there are no dependency cycles. The tasks now are executed ac cording to a topological order. Nate that if a task can not be attempted, the agent assigned that task does not incur the costs of attempting it. 3
However, the presence of dependencies, just like the presence of a combinatorial V, makes it impossible to satisfy IC, IR, CR, and SE.
Theorem 5 When dependencies exist between tasks, there does not exist a mechanism that satisfies IC, IR, CR, and SE for any n 2: 2 and t 2: 2.
Proof: Proof by induction. We first show that a mechanism cannot satisfy IC, IR, CR, and SE for the base case of n = t = 2. The inductive step then shows that increasing either n or t cannot alter this impossi bility result.
Base Case: We prove the base case by contradiction.
Assume that there exists a mechanism that satisfies IC, IR, CR, and SE. This implies that it satisfies these properties for all possible instances, where we define a instance as a particular set of agent types and decla rations, task dependencies, and a V function. We will use 3 possible instances in order to derive properties that must hold in the mechanism, but lead to a con tradiction. The constants in these instances are that task 2 is dependent on task 1 and that the center has value of 5 for task 2 being completed, but no value for the completion of task 1 in isolation. The five types that we will use, 01, 0�, 0 � , 02, and 0�, are defined in Table 2 (the final type, Oe, will be used later in the inductive step). Instance 1: The true types are 01 and 82, and the declared types are 01 and 0�. To satisfy SE, task 1 is assigned to agent 2, and task 2 to agent 1. That is, A1(01 , 0�) = (0, 1) and A2(81,0�) = (1, 0). Since agent 2's true type is 82, she will fail on task 1, preventing task 2 from being attempted. Thus, M = (0, 0) with probability 1. The expected utility for agent l is then:
3This is the reason why the current setting is not a spe cial case of the combinatorial V setting where the valuation of a set of tasks is the valuation of the subset for which the prerequisites are met.
Instance 2: The true types are 11 � and 1l2, and the de clared types are 111, and 112. Thus, the only difference from instance 1 is agent 1 's true type which is insignif icant, because agent 1 never gets to attempt a task.
Thus, we have a similar expected utility function:
ilt (c �, 11 t, 112, ( p � ,p2)) = R t ((11 t, 112 ) , (0,0 )) Instance 3: The true types are 11 � and 112, and the de clared types are 11�, and 112. Now we have also changed agent 1 's declared type to 11 � . Both tasks will be al located to the null agent: A t (11� ,B2) = A 2 (B�,B2 ) = (0, 0 ) . Therefore, /l = (0, 0 ) still holds with probabil ity 1, and we get the following equations:
fit (c�,B�,112,(p�,p2)) = R I ((B �, B2 ) ,(0,0 )) u2(c2,B2,11�, ( p�,p2)) = R 2 ((B�,e; ) ,( O,o)) If R2((B�,B2), (0,0 )) < 0 , then IR would be violated if e; were indeed the true type of agent 2, because the assignment function would be the same. Since the center thus receives no payment from agent 2, and it never gains any utility from completed tasks, the CR condition requires that RI((B�, e; ) , (0, 0 )) ::; 0. Thus, ul(c�,B�,e;, ( p �, p2)) ::; o .
Notice that if agent 1 lied in this instance and de clared her type to be 81, then we are in instance 2. So, to preserve IC, agent 1 must not have incentive to make this false declaration. u I ( C t ' Bl' e;' (p�' P2)) = R t ((B I, B2), (0,0 )) ::; fit (c�,B�,B2, ( p�,p2)) ::; 0.
Instance 1: Now we return to instance 1. Having shown that R1((B1, B2 ) , (0,0 )) ::; 0, we know that when agent 1 declares truthfully in this instance, her ex pected utility will be: ul(c�,B1,B2, p) ::; 0.
We will now show that agent 1 must have a pos itive expected utility if she falsely declares 11�.
In this case, both tasks are assigned to agent 1.
That is, A1(B�,B2 ) = (1, 1 ) . We know that R2((B�,B2),(1,1)) 2:4 by IR for agent 1, because if B� were agent 1 's true type, then both tasks would be completed and agent 1 would incur a cost of 4.
We now know that if agent 1 falsely declares B� in in stance 1: fit (c�,B�,B2,p) = Rt((B�,B2 ) , (1, 1)) -(cu + c12) ;::: 4-3 2: 1. Thus, agent 1 has incentive to falsely declare B� in instance 1, violating IC. Thus, we have reached a contradiction and completed the proof of the base case.
Inductive
Step: We now prove the inductive step, which consists of two parts: incrementing n and in crementing t. In each case, the inductive hypothesis is that no mechanism satisfies IC, IR, CR, and SE for n = x and t = y, where x, y 2: 2.
Part 1: For the first case, we must show that no mechanism exists that satisfies IC, IR, CR, and SE for n = x + 1 and t = y, which we will prove by con tradiction. Assume that such a mechanism does exist.
There is a one-to-one mapping from every instance in which n = x and t = y to an instance that only dif fers in the addition of an "extra" agent who truthfully declares her type Be. Since such an instance satisfies n = x + 1 and t = y, our mechanism must satisfy IC, IR, CR, and SE for this instance. Because of SE, this mechanism can never assign the task to the extra agent. Because of IR, this mechanism can never re ceive a positive payment from the extra agent. Since in each instance the only effect that the extra agent can have on the mechanism is to receive a payment from the center, we can transform this mechanism into one which satisfies IC, IR, CR, and SE for all instances where n = x and t = y by simply removing the rev enue function and assignment function for the extra agent, contradicting the inductive hypothesis.
Part 2: For the second case, we need to show that no mechanism can satisfy IC, IR, CR, and SE for n = x and t = y + 1. We use a similar proof by contradiction, starting from the assumption that such a mechanism does exist. There is a one-to-one mapping from every instance in which n = x and t = y to an instance of n = x and t = y+ 1 through the addition of an "extra" task te that is not involved in any dependencies and for which the center has no value for its completion. By SE, if a satisfying mechanism exists, then there exists a satisfying mechanism that always assigns this task to the dummy agent (recall that this is equivalent to not assigning the task). We can transform this mechanism into one which satisfies our goals for n = x and t = y by simply removing the assignment of te to the dummy agent. Once again, we have contradicted the inductive hypothesis, and the proof is complete.
• Interestingly, by slightly altering our mechanism we can solve the problem in an equilibrium. Task The only difference from the Multiple Task Mecha nism is that the first term of the payment rule uses the actual completion vector, instead of the distribu tion induced by the declaration of the other agents. As a result, our properties are satisfied only as an equilib rium: if all agents declare truthfully, then no agent has incentive to deviate to a different declaration. While there is no formal name for this type of equilibrium, it is similar in spirit to a Nash equilibrium, but techni cally different because there is no common knowledge of the game (since privately-known types affect the utility of other agents). It is also similar to a Bayes Nash equilibrium, but much stronger because it holds regardless of agent beliefs about the prior distributions for the types of the other agents. We define Equilib rium IC to hold if truth-telling is such an equilibrium.
Equilibrium Multiple
Equilibrium IR and SE are defined similarly.
Theorem 6 The Equilibrium Multiple Task Mecha nism satisfies NFR, Equilibrium IC, Equilibrium IR, and Equilibrium SE, even when dependencies exist.
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COST VERIFICATION
A practical drawback of our mechanisms is that the payments (or fines) may be very large, especially when service provider is far more efficient than the other agents. Also, since CR is not satisfied in our most general settings, the designer has to take a risk. is that the payments can be normalized by any linear function, thus making the potential losses more rea sonable for both the agents and the center. Due to space constraints we omit these constructions.
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DISC USSION & FUTURE WORK
In this paper we studied task allocation problems in which agents may fail to complete their assigned tasks.
For the settings we considered (single task, multi ple tasks with combinatorial properties, and multiple tasks with dependencies) we provided either a mecha nism that satisfies our goals or an impossibility result.
It is worth pointing out that all of the results in this pa per hold when we expand the set of possible failures to include rational, intentional failures, which occur when an agent increases her utility by not attempting an as signed task (and thus not incurring the corresponding cost). Modelling this possibility would complicate our model without changing any of our results. Intuitively, our positive results continue to hold because the pay ment rule aligns an agent's utility with the welfare of the system. If failing to attempt some subset of the assigned tasks would increase the welfare, then these tasks would not have been assigned to any agent. Obviously, all impossibility results would still hold when we expand the set of possible actions for the agents.
Many interesting directions stem from this work. Two possibilities are retrying tasks after a failure or allow ing multiple agents to attempt the same task in par allel. The computation of our allocation and payment rules presents non-trivial algorithmic problems. Also, the payment properties for the center may be further investigated, especially in settings where CR must be sacrificed to satisfy our other goals.
Finally, we believe that the most important future work will be to consider a wider range of possible failures, and to discover new mechanisms to overcome them. In particular, we would like to explore the case in which agents may fail maliciously or irrationally.
For this case, even developing a reasonable model of the setting provides a major challenge.
